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Abstract 
There is a rising volume of literature on dispute resolution 
mechanisms (DRM) in a number of sectors. However, 
globally not much has been documented on DRM in police 
forces in different jurisdictions. This paper contributes to the 
literature on DRM by providing an assessment of the DRM 
in the Fijian police force. The analysis shows that the Fijian 
police force is still without a clear, transparent, independent 
and efficient DRM. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Employment and industrial relations issues have been a major area 
of concern globally. One important area of IR concerns solving 
grievances and industrial disputes. Globally, there is a lot of literature on 
how conflicts, grievances and industrial disputes are solved both in 
private and public sectors, in both developed and developing countries 
(Walker and Hamilton, 2011a). However, there is scant on the issue of 
dispute resolution mechanism in police forces. Even in large developed 
and developing countries, there is limited documentation on grievance 
resolution systems in the police force from an IR perspective. There is 
also no scholarly study of dispute resolution system in the police force in 
small island countries. Perhaps, the police sector has not generated 
enough interest among the scholars, resulting in lack of literature on this 
important sector in a society. This paper attempts to fill this gap by 
examining the grievance resolution system in the Fiji Police Force. 
 Therefore, the aim of this paper is to explore and critically analyse 
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the grievance resolution system in the Fiji Police Force. It focuses on the 
grievance resolution policy, legislation and practices in the Fiji Police 
Force, and tries to find out whether the system can be effectively used to 
resolve grievances emanating from the employer and employees. It also 
compares the past and present grievance resolution legislation, procedures 
and practices with a view to improve the DRM in the Fiji Police Force. 
The paper also provides recommendations to improve and have an 
effective method for a grievance resolution to address the current 
problems and gaps. The aim is to improve the process of grievance 
resolution so that it helps in improving employment relations of the Fiji 
Police Force.  
 Fiji has a progressive labour legislation (the ERP, 2007) which 
contains a grievance resolution mechanism (DRM) for resolving 
grievances and industrial disputes for both private and public sector. 
However, it does not cover DRM in the Fiji Police Force. In other words, 
the ERP (2007) does not have any jurisdiction over employment and 
industrial relations in the Fiji Police Force.  
 
Police Force Grievance Resolution System in Selected Countries: 
Britain, USA, Australia, NZ  
 
 The police sector has not attracted much attention from the 
academics and thus there is little literature on Dispute Resolution 
Mechanism in the police force. There is some literature on Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism in the police force in the developing countries 
such as the United Kingdom, USA, Australia and New Zealand. Since, 
Fiji is a former colony of the United Kingdom and geographically near 
Australia and New Zealand, it would be appropriate to discuss the 
literature on grievance resolution systems from these countries (namely 
the United Kingdom, Australia and NZ). For one, the structure and 
governance of the Fiji police force was established based on models from 
these countries. In addition, these countries provide continuous 
interactions with the Fijian police force, and have often come to its aid on 
a number of technical, operational, and management matters. 
 
DRM in the United Kingdom Police Force  
 
 Dick and Metcalfe (2001) have studied police welfare in the United 
Kingdom and argued that the working experiences, working conditions 
and the overall welfare of the United Kingdom police officers have 
largely been ignored in management literature. They found that how 
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police officers feel about their work has a strong bearing on organisation 
commitment. The review of the legislation (Laws of Britain, Police 
Reform Bill) shows that the United Kingdom police service has also 
undergone significant reforms particularly on grievance resolution. The 
legislation highlights the machineries of conciliation and arbitration that 
are commonly used to resolve grievances arising between the police 
employees and management. The legislation establishes a Police 
Negotiating Board which is the negotiating machinery for determining 
wages and working conditions of the police service in the United 
Kingdom. There is also a Police Advisory Board which provides an 
avenue for the resolution of industrial relations issues in the police force 
(Police Negotiating Board Annual Report, 2010). The first step is 
conciliation and if it fails then the grievance is referred to the Police 
Arbitration Tribunal (Laws of Britain, Police Reform Bill, 2002: 42). The 
tribunal, comprising a panel of three arbitrators, hears submissions from 
the Commissioner of police and the police officers association 
(Association of Chief Police Officers) before making a consensus 
decision. After making the decision, the arbitrators pass the decision to 
the Police Negotiating Board. The Home Secretary then scrutinizes the 
agreement and makes the final decision after carefully considering how 
and why the arbitrators arrived to that decision (Laws of Britain, Police 
Reform Bill, 2002).  
 
DRM in the USA Police Force  
 
 Researchers have examined issues affecting the police force in the 
USA. Bloom (1981) discussed the use of arbitration in solving grievances 
on salaries for New Jersey's Municipal Police Officers. His study found 
that pay agreements through negotiations by using ‘final-offer arbitration’ 
awards were significantly lower than those through negotiations 
conducted by the ‘conventional arbitration’ awards. Feuille and Delaney 
(1986), on the other hand, studied the use of ‘collective bargaining’ and 
‘interest based arbitration’ in settling matters of police salaries; they 
analysed police salaries data in 900 cities during the 1971-1981 period 
and they found that cities that used collective bargaining had positive 
effects on increasing the salaries of police officers, but cities that used the 
arbitration option saw little increase of salaries.  
 
DRM in the Australian Police Force  
 
 The police force in Australia can use the national Australian 
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Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) to solve industrial grievances 
(Bamber, Lansbury, Wailes, 2014). The AIRC is the federal tribunal that 
is tasked with resolving industrial grievance. It can intervene to arbitrate 
and endorse collective agreements, if it believes that the parties are not 
engaged in good faith negotiations and there are less chances of reaching 
an agreement (Ruskin and Smith: 1997: 314-25). The AIRC provides the 
services of conciliation, mediation, and arbitration services and is the 
main institution to solve industrial relations grievances. The Australian 
police force can use their services (Police Federation of Australia Annual 
Report (2002:15-21). The AIRC has a broad coverage over all employees 
and makes decisions that are legally binding (Bamber, Lansbury, Wailes, 
2014).  
 
DRM in the NZ Police force  
 
 In New Zealand, the police force normally uses the Mediation and 
Arbitration model to resolve grievances regarding wages and conditions 
of employment between the management of the New Zealand Police and 
the Police Union representing the police officers (William, Paul, 
Alexander (2014: 276). The Mediation-Arbitration model is a system that 
combines negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. This has been in place 
since 1990 for determining police pay and conditions. However, police 
officers are not allowed to take industrial action (such as strike); instead 
they need to go through the Med-Arb to resolve grievances. If there is a 
grievance, then the Department of Labour appoints the Mediator or 
Arbitrator who gets involved in the negotiation process between the 
parties to resolve the grievance, rather than waiting for a deadlock to 
occur and then referring it to the Tribunal (William, Paul, Alexander, 
2014: 276). This system tends to be more proactive as well as successful 
in the resolution of grievances.  
 
 For Fiji Chand and Lako (2014) have studied the DRM at the 
national level. Furthermore, Chand (2015) did a comparative study of 
DRM between Fiji and the Cook Islands. However, there is no literature 
on DRM in the Police Force. This research utilises qualitative research 
methodology to analyse the DRM in the Fiji Police force. A qualitative 
research is done basically to find out in-depth what is going on in a 
particular situation (Bouma, 2000: 35). The research data was collected 
through primary document review, review of legislation (such as Police 
Ordinance, 1966, Police Amendment Act 2003), literature review, 
archival research, and in-depth interviews (by using semi-structured 
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questionnaires) with police officers. The personal experiences of one of 
the researchers, who was an Assistant Police Commissioner earlier has 
also been relied on in this paper.  
 
Background of Fiji Police Force  
 
 The Royal Fiji Police Force was formally established by the 
Governor His Excellency Sir Hercules George Robert Robinson on the 
10th of October 1874 (Laws of Fiji, Royal Gazette: 1874:1-4). The 
institution of the Fiji Police Force is enshrined in the constitution, which 
grants authority for the establishment of the Office of the Commissioner 
of Police and other matters relating to policing (Constitution of Fiji, 
2013). By and large, the Fiji Police Force is responsible for ‘public safety 
and public order’ in the Republic of the Fiji Islands (Constitution of Fiji, 
2013). 
 
Structure of the Fiji Police Force 
 
 The Fiji Police Force has a centralized organisational structure. The 
structure is quite complex due to different levels and the size of the 
organisation. Appendix 1 shows the organisation chart of the Fiji Police 
Force. The Commissioner of Police is the Chief Executive Officer. To 
him report the Deputy Commissioner and the four Assistant 
Commissioners. The directors, divisional commanders, divisional crime 
officers, officers in-charge of districts, station officers, non- 
commissioned officers, police constables and police support officers 
come directly under the commands of Assistant Commissioners. In 
accordance with the Constitution of Fiji (2013), the Commissioner of 
Police has the sole authority on all aspects of policing. He delegates’ 
powers to the subordinates to execute police duties. The police force is 
structured in such a way that it adopts a ‘top-down’ approach; the 
subordinates need to strictly follow the chain of command while 
communicating to officers, ascending through the vertical hierarchy while 
strictly adhering to formal instructions in the cause of their normal police 
duties.  
 
Workforce in the Fiji Police Force 
 
 The Fiji Police Force had an establishment of 4,176 police officers 
in 2006. This included 2,643 regular police officers and 1,533 Police 
Support Officers (PSO) employed as un-established staff to strengthen 
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and supplement police operations in all major divisions (Police 
Administration Section, 2006). On average, one police officer is 
responsible for 213 people in every tour of duty. The police see this as an 
enormous task to perform for the safety and security of people. The Fiji 
Police Force is regarded as a service-oriented organisation; police officers 
are classified as public servants.  
 
Parties to Industrial Relations 
 
 The three main parties to industrial relations in the Fiji Police Force 
are the employer (Government), the Commissioner of Police, and the 
Police Association.  
 
Employer (Government of Fiji)  
 
 Similar to other countries, the government (state) is the employer 
for the Police officers. As per the Constitution of Fiji (2013), the Fiji 
Police Force comes under the jurisdiction of Minister for Home Affairs. 
The Minister for Home Affairs provides the budgetary allocations to fund 
all police operations and administrations costs. Furthermore, the Minister 
for Home Affairs makes the regulations, guidelines, and procedures 
governing the affairs of the Fiji Police Force. He/she gives general policy 
directions with respect to the maintenance of public safety and public 
order. Therefore, the Minister for Home Affairs holds the ultimate power 
over the Police Force. This is similar to the UK, where after the Police 
Reform Act, the Home Secretary has substantial powers to intervene in 
the management of police forces (Laws of Britain, Police Reform Bill: 
2002:42).  
 
The Commissioner of Police (Senior Management) 
 
 The Commissioner of Police is in charge of the police force. His 
powers are considerable. The Commissioner frequently consults the 
Minister for Home Affairs who has even greater powers of policy 
making. The Fiji police has a Board of Management’s (BOM), chaired by 
the Commissioner of Police, and comprising the Senior Management 
team, which includes the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Assistant 
Commissioner of Police and Senior Chief of Staff. The BOM meets on a 
monthly basis to discuss all important issues concerning the Force. The 
BOM advises the Minister for Home Affairs in regards to policy matters. 
The Commissioner of Police looks after the day-today-day administration 
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of the Force; he has complete power and influence over the Fiji Police. 
Since the Commissioner of Police is vested with the powers to manage 
the Fiji Police Force in regards to its organizational structure, 
administration, deployment of staff, and control of all its operational 
matters, he is the most powerful person in the Police Force. The 
Commissioner has the powers to hire and fire police officers from the 
rank of Inspector and below, while for officer plus ranks, the Police 
Commissioner has to seek prior approval from the Minister for Home 
Affairs. The Police Amendment Act (2003) mentions that no police 
officer can resign without the approval of the Police Commissioner. The 
Police Commissioner has the authority to promote officers, give rewards 
and at the same time demote officers who breach the code of conduct and 
behave unprofessionally. All employees (police officers) have to obey the 
command the Commissioner of Police and their senior staff (the Police 
Amendment Act, 2003, clause 12). 
 
The Police Association  
 
 The Police Association represents the employees (police officers). 
Between 1953 and 2003, three separate associations were formed to 
represent all police officers in different categories. The main purpose of 
these three associations was to raise concerns regarding police officer’s 
wages, working conditions, grievances, etc. The first Police Association 
was established in 1953 during the colonial British government and was 
initially formed by the Sub-Inspector rank staff. After 1966, with the 
enactment of the Police Act, 1966, this association ceased to exist. Instead 
three new police associations were allowed to be formed by the colonial 
administrators (Police Act, 1966, 1-10). On the 9 January 1978, the first 
police association, named the Gazetted Officers Association (GOA), was 
established. This represented police officers between the ranks of the 
Assistant Superintendent and the Senior Superintendent. On 21 January 
1966, the Subordinate Officers Association (SOA) was formed; this 
represented officers between the ranks of Police Constable and Sergeant 
Major. On 26 January 1966, the Inspectorate Officers Association (IOA) 
was established; this represented the Inspectorate officers. These Police 
Associations represented the interests of police officers (Police 
Association Records). 
 The formation of the three separate Police Associations was a 
strategic move by the colonial government to segregate the three different 
classifications of police officers to avoid the formation of a single large 
and powerful association. This reflected the ‘divide and rule’ philosophy 
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the British colonial government had adopted in various colonies. It should 
be noted also that the Police Associations were formed as ‘safety valves’ 
to maintain colonial control. The government did not want to create 
systematic disruptions which arise where there is no mechanism for 
release of tensions arising from unheard grievances. By allowing for 
police associations the colonial regime also required that grievances and 
conflicts had to be channelled through the police associations. By doing 
this, the colonial administrators institutionalized grievance handling so 
that conflicts could be aired, resolved and contained within the system 
without threatening of stability and order of the whole system.  
 In 2003, the Police Act (1966) was amended by the Police 
Amendment Act (2003). The amendment eliminated the three Police 
Associations and instead provided for a single association. In theory, the 
function of the Police Association is to negotiate with police management 
on matters affecting pay and conditions of service, but issues relating to 
discipline and promotion were dealt by police management and were left 
outside the scope of the association. 
 
Regulating Employment Relations in Fiji and the Police Force 
 
Employment Relations Promulgation (2007) 
 
 Currently, the main labour legislation that regulates and governs 
employment and industrial relations is the Employment Relations 
Promulgation (2007) (hereafter referred as ERP). This covers 
employment relations in almost all organisations, both in the private and 
public sectors. Under the ERP Fiji’s industrial relations system provides 
well-established procedures for grievance handling and resolution. 
However, 'the Fiji Police Force and Fiji Prisons and Correction Services, 
the Republic of Fiji Military Forces are not covered by ERP' (ERP, s2).  
 
Legislation Regulating Employment Relations in Fiji Police Force 
 
Prior to 1970: The Fiji Police Act (1966) did not have any provision on a 
DRM for the Fiji Police Force. Thus police officers had no mechanism 
for airing their grievances. The three police associations at that time only 
informally raised grievances with the Commissioner of Police, but very 
little was done to address grievances. The Commissioner was the judge, 
jury and executioner in the Force.  
 
After Independence: Force Standing Order (1972): After Fiji’s 
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independence in 1970, one regulation was passed to govern and regulate 
employment relations in the Fiji Police Force; this was the Force Standing 
Order (FSO) of 1972. The ‘Force Standing Order’ (1972) prescribed the 
general rules which guided the day-to-day work of police officers. It also 
included the general standard operating procedures for police officers and 
the conditions of employment (such as leave entitlements, allowances, 
sick leave, long service leave, etc.) (Force Standing Order 1972, s3).  
 
The Police (Amendment) Act (2003): Currently, the main legislation that 
guides the police force is the Police Amendment Act (2003). Under this, 
two important changes were made to the 1966 act. First, it allowed the 
three Police Associations to be amalgamated into a single body, and 
second it provided some steps of solving grievances in the Police force, 
be it only a quasi-method for addressing grievances. Although, the Police 
Amendment Act (2003) is not a strong progressive labour legislation, 
compared to the old Police Act (1966), it is slightly better in the sense 
that at least it provides for some DRM processes which was entirely 
absent in the old 1966 act. Since 2003, successive governments in Fiji 
have continued to use this amendment act to guide the police force. 
 
Police Association Regulation 2006: The 'third' regulation that governs 
and regulates employment relations and DRM is the Police Association 
Regulation (2006). This was a consequently regulation from the 2003 
Police Amendment Act. In 2006, the Minister for Home Affairs signed 
the Police Association Regulation of 2006 (Laws of Fiji; Police 
Association Regulation, 2006). This was done to clarify and add to the 
Police Amendment Act (2003). For example, the Police Amendment Act 
(2003) was vague regarding how to resolve a grievance; this was added in 
the Police Association Regulation (2005). In the Police Association 
Regulation (2005), the Minister for Home Affairs specified all the 
processes (steps) to be used to resolve grievances.  
 
Essential National Industries (Employment) Decree (ENI-2011): The 
fourth regulation is the Essential National Industries (Employment) 
Decree (ENI-2011). Under this, the police force is classified as an 
essential service. Thus, the ENI Decree also governs and regulates 
employment relations in the Fiji Police Force. Under the ENI Decree 
(2011), strikes by police personnel are illegal, trade unions are banned, 
and all grievances are to be solved internally between the ‘Bargaining 
Unit’ (representing employees).  
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DRM in Fiji Police Force 
 
 The Police Act (Cap 85) clearly stipulates that the discipline, 
promotion, training and transfer decisions are the prerogative of the 
Commissioner of Police based on the administrative and operational 
policies of the Fiji Police Force. No one can interfere or influence the 
operational and administrative decisions of the Commissioner of Police. 
The Minister for Defence can only direct and support the Commissioner 
of Police on policy and legal aspects; not on operational matters of the 
force. Operational matters include all elements of human resources 
management. It is within this overall legal perimeter that DRM within the 
police force is to be considered. 
 Figure 1 illustrates the four steps of resolving grievances in the Fiji 
Police Force under the Police Association Regulation. It should be noted 
that the DRM steps are to be understood within the context of the 
objectives of the association. S3 of the Regulation states the objects of the 
Association as follows: 
(a) to enable police officers to bring to the notice of Government 
any matter affecting their welfare and efficiency; and 
(b) to provide professionalism in policing and to negotiate with 
the Government on any matters affecting their pay and conditions 
of service within the Force. 
The regulation further states (s3(2)) that 'The object of the Association or 
any matter brought by it shall not cover or relate to any matter of 
discipline and promotion within the Force'. 
 The matters to be considered under the DRM, however, are not 
clearly defined. More specifically, the terms 'any matters affecting their 
pay and conditions of service within the Force' in the regulation need to 
be defined. Does this include matters of an individual pay, placement 
within a salary band (as distinction from promotion), demotion, transfer, 
allowances, work load, resources at hand for performance of the specified 
duties, and the like? So far, no matter has been taken to the courts for a 
definitive statement on this. The current operating guidelines is that the 
matters for DRM are only those relating to the pay and conditions of 
service (log of claims), thus of the entire police force rather than 
individual grievances.. 
The Enigma of Exile 105 
 
Figure 1: 'Grievance' Procedure under Police Association Regulation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors. based on Fiji Police Association Regulation (2006). 
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Step 1: The Police Association refers the matter to the Commissioner of 
Police  
  
 The first step is the requirement that the executives of the Police 
Association refer the matter to the Commissioner of Police. Note that an 
individual police officer cannot report a grievance himself/herself (unlike 
the provisions under ERP). The Commissioner of Police will make his 
recommendations and forward it to the Minister for Home Affairs. After 
making a decision, the Minister for Home Affairs will inform the 
Commissioner of Police and the Commissioner of Police will then inform 
the executives of the Police Association. 
 There are two points to note. First, at this stage the Commissioner 
of Police does not attempt to solve a grievance but only refers it to the 
Minister for Home Affairs to make a decision. Second, there is no direct 
communication between the executives of the Police Association and the 
Minister for Home Affairs, and vice versa, as all communication is via 
the Commissioner of Police.  
 If at step 1, there is a deadlock, i.e., the police officers and the 
Police Association do not accept the decision of the Minister for Home 
Affairs, then the matter is unresolved. If a grievance remains unresolved, 
then the next step (two) kicks in. Under this the executives of the Police 
Association will have to refer the grievance back to the Commissioner of 
Police.  
 
Step 2: Negotiation with the Commissioner of Police  
 
 The second step of resolving a grievance is the ‘negotiation’ 
process between the Commissioner of Police and the executives of the 
Police Association (Police Association Regulation, 2005: 6-7). In this 
stage, the Commissioner of Police is required to negotiate with the 
executives of the Police Association. Under the Regulation the 
Commissioner of Police is required to enter into negotiations in ‘good 
faith’ to resolve a grievance. The 'good faith' requirement is similar to the 
requirement under the ERP. At this stage the Commissioner of Police gets 
actively involved in solving a grievance (in contrast to step 1). If the 
executives of the Police Association are still not satisfied with the 
outcome of the negotiation and the grievance remains unresolved, then a 
deadlock is reached. If a grievance remains unresolved, then the next step 
(three) is for the Commissioner of Police to (for the second time) refer the 
grievance to the Minister for Home Affairs.  
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Step 3: Mediation Process  
 
 The third step of resolving a grievance is the requirement for the 
Minister for Home Affairs, in consultation with the executives of the 
Police Association, to appoint a mediator to resolve the grievance. The 
mediator could be either from the Ministry of Labour and Industrial 
Relations or someone from outside the government. The mediator is 
required to conduct the mediation process and attempt to resolve the 
grievance and make a decision within 21 days from the date of his/her 
appointment (Police Association Regulation, 2005: 6). 
 To date, however, no case has been referred by the Minister for 
Home Affairs to a mediator. Hence this stage of resolving a grievance is 
yet to be tested. The fact that so far no case has been referred by the 
Minster to a mediator, underscores the point that the Minister for Home 
Affairs and the Commissioner of Police can either resolve grievances or 
suppress them. Police generally believe that the latter is the norm in the 
Fiji Police Force, largely because the Fiji Police Association is very weak 
on industrial relations issues as it does not act as a trade union. It cannot 
do much, but accept the decision of the Minister for Home Affairs and the 
Commissioner of Police, although the Fiji Police Association may not be 
happy with the decision.  
 The Fiji Police Association stipulates that if the mediation process 
ends in a deadlock, then the Fiji Police Association can pursue the next 
step, which is inform the Minister and the Minister can refer a grievance 
to an arbitrator (Police Association Regulation, 2005: 7).  
 
Step 4: Arbitration 
 
 Arbitration is supposedly the fourth step of resolving a grievance in 
the Fiji Police Force. The Police Association Regulation (2005: 7-8) 
requires the Minister for Home Affairs to request (in writing) the Minister 
for Labour and Industrial Relations (MLIR) to appoint an arbitrator for 
the purpose of determination of a grievance. Upon receiving the request 
the Minister for Labour and Industrial Relations is obliged to appoint a 
person with extensive experience in law, economics or industrial relations 
to be an arbitrator. The Regulation is silent on whether the arbitrator will 
be same as those under the ERP. The arbitrator will be assisted by one or 
more assessors appointed and/or as approved by the MLIR. The criterion 
for the appointment of the arbitrator and assessors is that they must be 
residents of Fiji and not from outside. The arbitrator will have to 
determine the procedures for the arbitration proceedings using his/her 
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discretionary powers; this includes determining whether to hear 
submissions in writing or in person from the two parties. The arbitrator is 
obliged to make determination on a grievance within 28 days from the 
date of reference of a grievance (Police Association Regulation, 2005: 8). 
An extension can be granted if the Minister for Labour, in his/her 
opinion, feels that a grievance is complicated enough to warrant more 
time to make a decision (Police Association Regulation, 2005: 8).  
 
Weaknesses and Challenges of DRM in Police Force 
 
 Compared to developed countries, the DRM in the Fiji Police Force 
is in its infant stage. It is weak and underdeveloped. The most critical 
problem is that the Fiji Police Force is excluded from Fiji’s national 
labour law - the Employment Relations Promulgation (2007). The Police 
Association Regulation, 2005 is weak and underdeveloped. There are a 
number of weaknesses and challengers of DRM in Police Force 
 
Power of the Commissioner to control the Police Association  
 
 The Fiji Police Association is not a trade union. It is a weak 
organisation, which police personnel liken to a ‘toothless tiger’. One of 
the reasons why the Fiji Police Association is weak is because the 
Commissioner and the Minister for Home have the power to control the 
Police Association. The Commissioner has the power to suspend the 
Executive Council of the Police Association anytime he feels that the 
interest of the police force is jeopardized (the Police Amendment Act, 
2003). This provision curtails the democratic rights of the Police 
Association to effectively represent the interests of police officers. The 
implication of this provision is that the Police Association cannot apply 
IR-type pressure on the Commissioner or the Minister for Home Affairs 
during industrial negotiation (collective bargaining) or when dealing with 
a grievance. If the Police Association applies too much pressure during 
the process of collective bargaining they ultimately face suspension; the 
fear of suspension limits what the Police Association's demands in the log 
of claims as well as in pursuing to the full grievances of members 
(Interview with an Executive of the Police Association, January 2017). If 
the Police Association executive is suspended then there is no negotiation 
between the Police Commissioner and the Police Association.  
 The Police Association is in a precious position; their hands are 
always 'tied', preventing them from taking legitimate claims on the 
welfare of police officers up the ladder. The Police Association is, in 
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practice, constantly threatened with regulatory measures so that the 
executives or representatives do not have an upper hand during the 
bargaining process (Interview with an Executive of the Police 
Association, January 2017). 
 Furthermore, in most cases the police officers are under pressure to 
accept the decision of the Commissioner of Police and the Minister for 
Home Affairs. Both the Commissioner of Police and the Minister for 
Home Affairs can pressure the Police Association to accept their decision 
even though the Police Association may not agree with the decisions 
coming from the top. The threat or even perceived threat that the Police 
Association could be de-registered and/or their officials terminated from 
work, creates a form of self-defeatism in the Association. Under such 
constraints it will be quite difficult for any association to effectively 
function to advance the interests of its membership.  
 Furthermore, if there is deadlock after the negotiation between the 
Commissioner of Police and the Police Association (i.e. after step 2 
explained earlier), then technically only the Minister for Home Affairs 
can make recommendations to the Minister for Labour and Industrial 
Relations. The Police Association does not have this right. If the Minister 
for Home Affairs refuses to take the matter to the Minister for Labour and 
Industrial Relations, then the matter reaches a dead-end; the Police 
Association does not have any further recourse or remedy on this. The 
powers of the Minister are, ultimately, deemed to be discretionary. This is 
the final nail in the coffin of DRM for the police force. 
 
Deficiencies and Contradictions  
 
 There are a number of contradictions, deficiencies and issues in the 
legislation and the procedures of resolving a grievance in the Fiji Police 
Force.  
 The first contradiction is between the Police Amendment Act 
(2003) and the Police Association Regulation (2006). Under the Police 
Amendment Act 2003, the grievance procedure was not very transparent. 
There was the possibility the Minister for Home Affairs/Defence 
intervening to reinforce the negotiation process and later referring the 
dispute to mediation and arbitration. The latter could be held back or 
delayed. This created a conflict of interest. The Police Association 
Regulation (2006), however, is more specific with time frames and states 
that the Minister for Defence only refers disputes to a Mediator and 
appoints the Arbitrator, without interfering in the negotiation processes 
between the employer and employee 
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 It ought to be noted, however, that the 2003 Amendment Act 
provides for the formation and operation of the Police Association 
Regulations (PAR). S2(b) of the Amendment Act provides that the 
Minister may make regulations: 
(a) for the establishment and regulation of a police association 
(including the regulation of office bearers) for the purposes 
of enabling police officers to negotiate with the Government 
matters affecting their pay and conditions of service of the 
Force, other than discipline and promotion; 
(b) for the rules and procedures for negotiation of pay or 
conditions of service of the Force; 
(c) for the rules and procedures relating to the determination of 
grievance for disputes relating to pay and conditions of 
service of the Force. 
 
 This provision, and the drafting of the PAR, show that the conflict 
of interest situation has been eliminated. But to date, the only regulation 
made is that dealing with (a) above. There is no separate regulation on 
the rules and procedures for negotiation of pay or conditions of service of 
the Force', or on the 'rules and procedures relating to the determination of 
grievance for disputes relating to pay and conditions of service of the 
Force'. 
 The PAR, however, contains sections on procedures for 
negotiations and determination of disputes (s14-16). Whether provisions 
on these in a Regulation on establishment of the association is compliant 
with s2(b) of the Amendment Act is a critical matter. Under the normal 
rules of interpretation, the provisions of an Act takes precedence over 
Regulation.1 The Act requires that the minister make 'rules and 
procedures' for negotiation and dispute resolution. The Regulation 
provides specific objectives of the Association as quoted above. 
 A contextual interpretation of the above could provide convincing 
arguments that that Regulation on Police Association can not substitute 
for the requirement of regulations on rules and procedures on negotiation 
and disputes. This confusion or deficiency in clarity, needs to be dealt it. 
 In the absence of clarity on this, one could still resort to s18 of the 
Police Act. S18 of the Act has not been repealed. It can also not be 
overtaken by a regulation made under an amendment act. The effect is 
that S18 of the principal act continues to be valid. Unfortunately, this 
                                                        
1 We acknowledge Dr. Ganesh Chand for pointing out this and the discussion con-
tained in the remainder of this section of the paper. 
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critical point was not picked up by any trade unionist in Fiji, or by the 
then former or current trade union leaders who were in Parliament. S18 of 
the Police Act provides that: 
every inspectorate and subordinate officer and every special 
constable shall be entitled to make any complaint or application, 
either orally or in writing, to his superior officer who shall, on 
the request of the officer or special constable making such 
complaint or application, forward the same to the Commissioner 
without delay. 
But there is a limit to this: s18(2) states that no inspectorate or 
subordinate officer or any special constable shall 'prepare or initially sign 
any complaint, petition or statement of grievances in relation to any 
matter concerning the Force'. Matters relating to personal welfare, for 
example, promotion, training, transfer, discipline, etc., ultimately relate 
to matters which concern the police force. The lack of clarity in the 2 
subsections is a matter which neither the stakeholders nor the legal 
drafters, thought necessary to clarify. It is the position of this paper that 
s18 of the Act continues to remain effective; it has not been affected by 
the 2003 amendments. 
 The second limitation is that the law (Police Act, 1985, s18(c)) 
disallows any inspectorate or subordinate officer or any special constable 
to petition the President or the Minister in  
relation to any complaint or grievance unless such complaint or 
grievance has been previously communicated in writing through 
his superior officer to the Commissioner and the reply of the 
Commissioner relating to such complaint or grievance has been 
communicated to the officer or special constable making the 
same. 
Thus, if a grievance has been communicated and the Commissioner does 
not reply on it, the employee is left with no recourse. He/she could seek a 
writ of mandamus, under which a court could order the Commissioner to 
reply. But this would be an extreme step which will with all certainty 
seriously jeopardise the employment of the complainant. 
 Thirdly, the Act makes no provision for grievances on employees 
above the inspectorate rank. This gap can be arguably filled by the 2003 
amendments and the provisions of the Police Association, barring the 
obvious confusions listed above. 
 
Arbitrator 
 
 There is another set of confusion in the laws. This concerns the 
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appointment of the arbitrator. The Police Association Regulation is silent 
on whether the Minister for Labour can appoint an arbitrator from the 
arbitration mechanism under the ERP. Under the ERP the Labour 
Minister does not have the jurisdiction to appoint a mediator or an 
arbitrator to resolve a grievances in the Fiji Police Force for any dispute 
lodged with the Labour Ministry by an individual police officer or an 
association of police officers. But if the grievance came through the 
Minister for Home Affairs, could the Minister for Labour then appoint the 
arbitrator under the rules of the ERP? In essence, the question on whether 
the rules of arbitration under ERP would apply to the police grievance, 
needs a clear answer. Without that, the DRM in the Fiji Police Force 
remains vague, underdeveloped and possibly un-operational. One 
possible way to address this is to amend the relevant laws and regulations 
and/or provide for the clarity in a separate legislation. 
 
Police Association Regulation (2005) and the ERP (2007) 
 
 While the Fiji Police Force is excluded from the scope of the ERP 
(2007), there are similarities between it and the provisions under the 
Police Association Regulation. Firstly, the notion of ‘good faith’ 
bargaining is mentioned in the Police Association Regulation. Under this, 
the Commissioner of Police is required to enter into negotiations with the 
Police Association in ‘good faith’. In reality, however this never happens 
(Interview with an Executive of the Police Association, January 2017). 
Good faith needs to be demonstrated. The Police hierarchical culture and 
discipline needs to be re-oriented to allow for ‘good faith’ dealings. This 
is not likely to be an easy exercise. 
 Secondly, the ‘mediation process’ is included in the Police 
Association Regulation. To date, however, no grievance has been referred 
to mediation and it is unlikely that in future any case will be referred to 
mediation. Mediation is a useful process for individual grievances. The 
latter is, supposedly, outside the scope of the Association. For 
completeness, it should to be noted that there is a difference on who could 
be a mediator. Under the ERP, only a staff from the Ministry of Labour 
and Industrial Relations could be a mediator, whereas in the case of the 
Police Association Regulation, a mediator could be either from the MLIR 
or someone outside the government ministries.  
 Thirdly, the Arbitration system is included in the Police Association 
Regulation and in certain important respects, is similar to the provisions 
under the ERP. However, the procedures and processes of how the 
arbitration is supposed to function, is not clearly spelt out. Numerous 
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questions arise. Will the MLIR use the Employment Relations Tribunal to 
resolve disputes in the Fiji Police Force? Will the arbitration structure be 
the same as the Employment Relations Tribunal under ERP or have a 
different structure? Will the arbitration have the status of a magistrate’s 
court under the ERP? Will the arbitration function in a legal manner with 
each party being allowed to be represented by a lawyer and allowed to 
call experts to support their cases? Since no case so far has been referred 
to the arbitration by the Minister for Home Affairs, these questions 
remain unanswered.  
 
The Police Association cannot act as a Trade Union 
 
 The Police Association is not allowed to be registered as a trade 
union. Nor is it allowed to take up grievances under the ERP. But when 
the Minister for Home Affairs refers an unresolved matter to the Minister 
for Labour and Industrial Relations, who then resorts to the resolution 
process, the Police Association will have to play exactly the same role as 
a trade union would. One way to replace the de-facto behaviour required 
of the Association by a non-pretentious one, is to allow the Association to 
register as a trade union. The other method is for the Association to 
employ full time employees of its own in capacities like Industrial 
Relations Officer(s), who will report to the Association executives. The 
IRO could, under their JDs, be mandated to carry out all IR work required 
of the Association, including advancing the Association's case with equal 
rigour as a trade union would. This method would shield the police, who 
as employees of the state would be hesitant to take matters with the 
energy and vigour likened to that of a union official. There is no 
provision in the Regulations disallowing the Association from employing 
its own staff. 
 The above, however, would not solve the fundamental problem: the 
Regulation disallows anyone to take up grievances on individual IR 
matters like promotions, demotions, transfers, discipline, and the like. 
These are fundamental human rights matters, which under the current 
laws, are dis-availed to the police force employees. 
 
 Minister for Home Affairs: Independence and Neutrality  
 
 The Police Association Regulation is silent on situations where the 
Minister for Home Affairs could himself/herself be a party to the 
grievance. This potential for ‘conflict of interest’ needs to be addressed in 
the Regulations.  
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Appeal System  
 
 There is no provision for an appeal system in the Police Association 
Regulation. Hence police officers do not have the opportunity for further 
redress if they are not content with a decision of the Commissioner or the 
Minister for Home Affairs. Normally, a good grievance resolution 
mechanism should have an appeal mechanism which provides an 
aggrieved party an opportunity for further redress.  
 
Recommendations 
 
 Since the DRM system in the Fiji police force has major flaws and 
deficiencies, the following recommendations are suggested to improve 
the DRM system.  
 Both the Police Amendment Act (2003) and the Police Association 
Regulation (2005) are obsolete vis-à-vis the demands of police force 
worker rights. It is likely that thorough consultations were not done while 
developing the DRM for the Fiji police force. The whole system is 
designed with strict regulatory measures to deny police officers recourse 
to an efficient and fair grievance mechanism. There is an urgent need to 
bring about a major reform for police employment and industrial relations 
laws, guidelines, procedures, and processes. There is a need for 
streamlining employment relations issues in the police force. In this 
context, the Police Act, the Police Amendment Act and the Police 
Association Regulation need thorough reviews, with the overriding 
objective being the need to provide the police workforce a quality 
grievance and dispute resolution mechanism. 
 An alternative approach would be to allow the police workforce the 
same rights and privileges which other workforce have under the ERP. 
This approach will prevent the development of separate legislation for the 
police force, and also allow for equal application of laws in Fiji. 
 Yet another approach would be to establish an independent Police 
Arbitration Tribunal that will handle all grievance, mediation and 
arbitration matters concerning the police workforce. This could be along 
similar lines as the Police Arbitration Tribunal of the United Kingdom. 
 There is a genuine need for an independent appeals system in the 
Police force, which is equivalent to that of the Public Service Appeals 
Board. This mechanism will provide an opportunity for an appeals service 
granted to police officers, who have issues on management’s decision, 
particularly in matters of promotion and discipline.  
 The matter of allowing the Police Association to be registered as a 
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trade union needs to be revisited. Equal application of human rights 
would require that restrictions on the freedom of association of the police 
workforce be repealed from all laws. 
 A matter of immediate concern is that of deadlocks. At present, if 
there is a deadlock between the Commissioner of Police and the 
Executive Council of the Police Association in the negotiation stage of 
the process, the Commissioner of Police has the right to report the matter 
to the Minister for Home Affairs. The Police Association does not have 
such a right. A fair system would empower both the parties to report the 
deadlock. Second, presently only the Minister for Home Affairs has the 
right to refer an unresolved matter to the Minister for Labour and 
Industrial Relations for mediation or arbitration. This restriction needs to 
be repealed to allow for equal application of laws in Fiji. 
 Finally, the Police Association should become independent from 
the management of Fiji Police Force. While there is an appearance of 
independence in the Regulation, in effect the Police Association is under 
direct control of the management of the police force. Punitive measures 
are the norm in the Force. This needs to end if the police workforce is to 
be provided an equal opportunity for the resolution of their employment 
related grievances.. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This paper has examined the grievance resolution machinery in the 
Fiji Police Force. It has discussed some of the problems and weaknesses 
in the current dispute system. Overall, the employment relations 
legislation in the Police Force are old and still under/undeveloped. The 
whole process of solving grievances is riddled with uncertainties and 
inconsistencies. There is still uncertainty on the definition of a 'grievance' 
within the police force. A large part of the documentation seem to imply 
that there is no procedure for dealing with 'grievances' of personal or 
individual nature, for example those dealing with promotions, demotions, 
transfers, training opportunities, bullying, harassment, discrimination, and 
the like., with the view that all these are to be dealt only by the 
Commissioner of Police without reference to any process or procedure. 
But some sections of the law and regulations provide scope for one to 
interpret that individual grievances can be dealt with through the DRM. 
There has so far not been any definitive legal interpretation of the scope 
of the process and procedures outlined in the Police Act, the Police 
(Amendment) Act, and the Police Association Regulation.  
 While the Police Association Regulation 2006 is more specific in 
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terms of dealing with certain types of grievances, there also remain 
confusion on aspects of this. A number of these issues have been 
discussed in this paper. The fundamental issue remains that of the lack of 
any independent and efficient system of individual and collective 
grievance resolution mechanism in contrast to a wider industry-level 
grievance matter (like overall terms and conditions of employment). An 
organisation which employs over 4,000 persons needs a clear, 
transparent, independent and efficient system of grievance resolution. 
Despite the 2003 amendment to the Police Act, this remains the main 
human resource challenge for the Fijian police force. 
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